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et al.: Cruel & Unusual Punishment

CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
N.Y. CoNsT. art.I, § 5"

Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted,
nor shall witnesses be unreasonablydetained.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VM
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusualpunishments inflicted.
COURT OF APPEALS

People v. Thompson 1
(decided March 30, 1994)
The State appealed the appellate division's affirmation of the
trial court's holding that for a conviction of selling cocaine, the
impositioli of the minimum mandatory indeterminate sentence of
fifteen years to life imprisonment on a seventeen year-old
defendant with no prior criminal record would constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. 2 The New York Court of Appeals
reversed both lower courts and held that the defendant's youth
and other mitigating factors were insufficient to establish the
gross disproportionality of the sentence for imprisonment in light
of the epidemic proportions of drug dealing in our present
society. 3 The court further found that mandatory sentencing
provisions for drug-related offenses enacted by the State

1. 83 N.Y.2d 477, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 611 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1994).
2. Id. at 479, 633 N.E.2d at 1075, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
3. Id. at 482-85, 633 N.B.2d at 1077-79, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 473-75.
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Legislature, although relatively severe, were constitutional under
6
both State 4 and Federal 5 Constitutions.
On August 31, 1988, the defendant sold 214 vials of cocaine
for $2,000 to an undercover police officer and further "promised
to 'take care of him 'the next time' he came." 7 On December
11, 1989, the defendant, who was then seventeen years old, was
convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first
degree 8 for the sale of two ounces, or thirty-three grams of
cocaine, a class A-I felony that carries a mandatory indeterminate
sentence imposed by Penal Law section 70.00 (2)(a), (3)(a)(i), of
which the minimum is between fifteen to twenty-five years and
the maximum is life imprisonment. 9 Although the defendant's
uncle, a co-defendant, was the prime mover of the drug operation
and indicted for five criminal counts of selling a controlled
substance in the first degree, he pleaded guilty to one such count
in a plea bargain and was sentenced to fifteen years to life
imprisonment. 10 The trial court found that because the defendant
had no prior criminal record, was enrolled in college prior to
incarceration, was a product of a broken family (orphaned at an
early age), was the mother of a young son, had already served
three years of her sentence, appeared to have sold the cocaine at
the behest of her uncle, and especially, because of the
defendant's youth, 11 even the imposition of the minimum
indeterminate mandatory sentence of fifteen years to life would
4. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. This provision states that: "Excessive bail
shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual

punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained." Id.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This provision states that: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id.
6. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 485, 633 N.E.2d at 1079, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
475.

7.
8.
1993).
9.
471.
10.
11.

Id. at 479, 633 N.E.2d at 1075, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
People v. Thompson, 190 A.D.2d 162, 596 N.Y.S.2d 421 (lst Dep't
Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 479, 633 N.E.2d at 1075, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
Id. at 484, 633 N.E.2d at 1078, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
Thompson, 190 A.D.2d at 165-66, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23.
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constitute cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the New
York State Constitution, article I, section five and the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 12 Invoking the
"rare" exceptional case referred to in the seminal case of People
v. Broadie,13 the trial court imposed a lower imprisonment term
of eight years to life imprisonment. 14 The appellate division
affirmed the trial court's judgment and stated that "[c]ertainly,
the imposition of such a harsh punishment on a teenager violates
the constitution." 15
In strict adherence to Broadie, however, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed both the trial court's and appellate division's
judgment, and re-sentenced the defendant to fifteen years to life
imprisonment as mandated by statute. 16 In Broadie, although the
court noted that no punishment had ever been found to be
unconstitutionally disproportionate in New York, it adopted the
principle that an imprisonment sentence may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment if it is "grossly disproportionate to the
crime." 17 To assess whether a punishment is grossly
disproportionate, the Broadie court established a three-prong
analysis: 1) "the gravity of the offense;" 2) a comparison
between "the challenged punishments with those prescribed in the
same jurisdiction for other offenses, and also with punishments
for the same or similar offenses prescribed in other

12. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 479, 633 N.E.2d at 1075, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
471.
13. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975). Eight
defendants were convicted of selling heroin and cocaine. Id. at 110. 332
N.E.2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 474. Defendants challenged the
constitutionality of the "drug" laws, statutes classifying the crimes of the sale
of controlled substances as class A felonies, the highest rank of crime in New
York State, that imposed a mandatory minimum sentence from one or six years
to eight and one-third years, and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
Id.
14. Thompson, 190 A.D.2d at 163, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
15. Id. at 167, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
16. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 479, 633 N.E.2d at 1075, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
471.
17. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d at 111, 332 N.E.2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
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jurisdictions;" and, 3) "the character of the offender and gravity
of the threat he poses to society." 18
In assessing the first prong, the gravity of the offense element,
the court in Thompson held that "time has not eroded this Court's
conclusion in Broadie that the selling of narcotic drugs represents
a grave offense of the first magnitude. " 19 As adopted by the
Broadie court, the primary focus in determining the gravity of the
offense was "the harm it causes to society." 20 In regard to drug
trafficking crimes, the Broadie court reasoned that the legislature
may "properly view criminal narcotics sales not as a series of
isolated transactions, but as symptoms of widespread and
pernicious phenomenon of drug distribution .... [t]he drug
seller, at every level of distribution, is at the root of the pervasive
cycle of destructive drug abuse. " 2 1 Within this cycle, the Broadie
court emphasized that drug trafficking, because of its high stakes
and illegal nature, generates "collateral" crimes that often result
in violence against law enforcement officers and violence even
among drug dealers themselves, while simultaneously furthering
the generation of new drug addicts whose addiction "degrades
and impoverishes those whom it enslaves." 2 2 Thus, the Broadie
court concluded that "[m]easured thus by the harm it inflicts
upon the addict, and, through him, upon the society as a whole,
drug dealing in its present epidemic proportions is a grave
offense of high rank."23
In assessing the second prong, the court in Thompson held that
the nineteen years spanning between Broadie and the case at bar
have not changed the conclusion that "mandatory sentences for
drug offenses are 'relatively severe, but not irrationally so, given
18. Id. at 112-13, 332 N.E.2d at 342-43, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77. See
Allyn G. Heald, Criminal Law: United States v. Gonzalez: In Search of a
Meaningful Proportionality Principle, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 455 (1992)
(advocating the test espoused in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
19. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 482, 633 N.B.2d at 1077, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
473.
20. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d at 112, 332 N.E.2d at 342, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
21. Id. at 112, 332 N.E.2d at 342, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
22. Id. at 113, 332 N.E.2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
23. Id.
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the epidemic dimensions of the problem.'"24 Noting that a
comparison with punishments for other crimes in New York and
with punishments for the same or similar crimes in other
jurisdictions would be helpful in assessing the gravity of the
offense, the Broadie court found that the punishment in New
25
York for drug trafficking was relatively severe.
In comparison with other crimes in New York, the Broadie
court conceded that drug offenses were "punished more severely
26
and inflexibly than almost any other offense in the State."
However, because drug dealing itself is a "grave offense of high
rank" that generates collateral crimes, often violent crimes,
which "have a higher and rising incidence, than other crimes
comparably punished or equally grave crimes not as severely
punished," drug-related crimes require "greater isolation and
deterrence. "27

In comparison with punishment in other jurisdictions, the
Broadiecourt also found that drug offenses were "punished more
severely in [New York] State than in other jurisdictions. " 28 The
24. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 482, 633 N.E.2d at 1077, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
473 (quoting Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d at 117, 332 N.E.2d at 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d at
480-81).
25. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d at 115-16, 332 N.E.2d at 344-45, 371 N.Y.S.2d
at 479-80.
26. Id. at 115, 332 N.E.2d at 344, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
27. Id. at 116, 332 N.E.2d at 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
28. Id. See State v. Padilla, 817 P.2d 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming
sentence of nine years imprisonment plus $205,000 fine for possession of
cocaine valued at $280,000); State v. Wise, 795 P.2d 217 (Ariz. CL App.
1990) (sentence of nine years imprisonment for possession of eight kilograms
of cocaine to be sold); State v. Somervile, 572 A.2d 944 (Conn. 1990)
(affirming statutory imposed minimum sentence of not less than five years nor
more than twenty years for possession of more than one ounce of cocaine with
intent to sell); State v. Fairchild, 829 P.2d 550 (Idaho CL App. 1992)
(affirming the sentencing of the defendant to an imprisonment term of five
years for the possession of more than three ounces of marijuana with intent to
deliver); People v. Schultz, 460 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1990) (remanding the
case for re-sentencing of the defendant to a lower prison term than the imposed
term of twenty to thirty years for the possession of ten ounces of cocaine);
State v. Roberson, 588 A.2d 434 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1991) (affirming
the imposition of a three-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for
possession of more than one-half ounce but less than five ounces of cocaine
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Broadie court, however, reasoned that severe punishment for
drug offenses was justified in New York because "drug
trafficking is more extensive in New York" and recognized that
"California, with a similar drug problem, punishes drug
29
trafficking almost as severely as New York."
In assessing the third prong, the court in Thompson held that
the defendant's culpability in the drug transaction was sufficiently
high and the threat which the defendant poses to society, as
examined under the facts of this particular case, justified the
punishment. 30 Although the defendant had no prior criminal
record, the court reasoned that because the defendant had made
$2,000 "wholesale" deal for 200 vials of cocaine,
"knowledgeably haggled with [the undercover officer] over the
amount of the customary bonus of additional vials," insisted on
only giving the officer fourteen additional vials instead of twenty,
and then "promis[ed] to 'take care of' him personally 'the next
time' he came," the court concluded that the defendant was
"motivated by a desire 'to obtain personal profit" 31 and rejected
32
the notion that the defendant was an "accidental" offender.
The court in Thompson emphasized that whereas the defendant
in People v. Jones33 may be characterized as "'perhaps an
accidental' offender," the trial judge in the case at bar was
with intent to distribute); State v. Hernann, 474 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (affirming the trial court's sentencing the defendant to the statutory
minimum of five years imprisonment on each count of delivery of a controlled
substance); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993) (affirming the
sentence of a statutorily imposed prison term of not less than two and one-half
years but no more than seven years for possessing four and one-half ounces of
uncut cocaine with intent to deliver).

29. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d at 116, 332 N.E.2d at 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
30. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 482-84, 633 N.E.2d at 1077-79, 611
N.Y.S.2d at 473-75.
31. Id. at 484, 633 N.E.2d at 1075-78, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 471-74.
32. Id. at 483, 633 N.E.2d at 1078, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
33. 39 N.Y.2d 694, 350 N.E.2d 913, 385 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1976). In Jones,
the defendant was a "millhand," a drug packager who was at the lowest level
among the hierarchy of a large-scale heroin distribution operation and had no
control over the amount of drugs present on the premises. Id. at 696, 350
N.E.2d at 914, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
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4
convinced that the defendant was in fact guilty as charged. 3
Even for a possible accidental offender, however, the Jones court i
held that the wide disparity between the defendant's sentence of
fifteen years to life imprisonment, and twelve other persons'
sentences ranging from three years to twenty-five years arising
from the same police raid, did not amount to grossly
disproportionate punishment. 3 5 Similarly, in People v.
Donovan,3 6 the court held that there was no gross
disproportionate punishment where the defendant had procured
the drugs without the motive for personal profit and at the behest
of her boyfriend, a drug dealer, who was only sentenced to
lifetime probation for cooperating with the authorities. 37 The
court further reasoned that although the defendant's uncle's "far
greater culpability merited substantially more punishment than

34. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 483, 633 N.E.2d at 1078, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
474 (quoting Jones, 39 N.Y.2d at 701, 350 N.E.2d at 918, 385 N.Y.S.2d at
529 (Breitel, C.J., dissenting)).
35. Jones, 39 N.Y.2d at 696, 350 N.E.2d at 914-15, 385 N.Y.S.2d at
526. In Jones, the court was called to determine whether the marked
discrepancy between the sentence imposed upon the defendant, a "millhand" in
a large-scale heroin distribution operation, and the sentences imposed upon
twelve other persons arrested in the same police raid, constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 696, 350 N.E.2d at 914, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 526. The
defendant was convicted of criminal joint possession of a dangerous drug in
the first degree for joint possession of over four pounds of heroin and
sentenced to an indeterminate term from 15 years to life imprisonment. Id.
Although the defendant was given the opportunity to plead to a lesser offense
similar to the twelve others arrested in the same raid, she had declined to do
so. Id. Depending on the crime to which each of the twelve persons pleaded
guilty, they received imprisonment sentences ranging from 3 years to 25 years.
Id.
36. 89 A.D.2d 968, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1982), af'd, 59 N.Y.2d
834, 451 N.E.2d 492, 464 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1983). In Donovan, the defendant
was convicted of first degree criminal sale and first degree possession of a
controlled substance, approximately fbur ounces of cocaine, and was sentenced
to 15 years to life imprisonment. Id. at 968, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 119. Although
the defendant was given the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser offense that
carried one to three years imprisonment, the defendant rejected that plea
proposal. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 481, 633 N.E.2d at 1077, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
473.
37. Donovan, 89 A.D.2d at 968, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
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[the sentence] defendant received," the fact that the defendant
and her uncle received the same indeterminate sentence of fifteen
years to life imprisonment was insufficient to establish grossly
disproportionate punishment. 38
Moreover, the court stressed that because the defendant had
made a $2,000 "wholesale" deal for 214 vials of cocaine, her
level of culpability and the threat to society was at least a step
higher than defendants who had prior convictions of mere
"street" sales or possessions as in Broadie.39
In Broadie, although the court stated that none of the eight
defendants were "hardened" criminals, the court found that they
were also not what are often called "accidental" offenders,
because all eight defendants were convicted of at least "street"
sales or possession of heroin or cocaine. 4 0 Thus, the Broadie
court concluded that "[a]s sellers, they cannot disclaim their roles
in the scourge of drug distribution," and that each of the
defendants may reasonably be considered a serious threat to
society meriting severe punishment. 4 1 Thus, the Broadie court
found that the imposed mandatory sentences were not grossly
disproportionate for the criminal sale of a controlled substance
and held that the mandatory sentencing provisions were
constitutional, both facially and as applied. 42
In addressing the "rare" exception case as envisioned in
Broade,4 3 the court briefly concluded that although the
defendant's pre-sentence report did evince some mitigating
factors, the defendant failed to "demonstrate such an exceptional
level of childhood deprivation that would significantly excuse her
behavior."44 Referring to the defendant's probation officer's pre38. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 484, 633 N.E.2d at 1078, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
474.
39. Id. at 483, 633 N.E.2d at 1077-78, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 473-74.
40. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d at 113, 332 N.E.2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
41. Id. at 114, 332 N.E.2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
42. Id. at 117, 332 N.E.2d at 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 481. See People v.
Johnson, 53 A.D.2d 777, 384 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't 1976) (upholding
mandatory maximum sentences of life imprisonment as constitutional).
43. Id. at 119, 332 N.E.2d at 347, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
44. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 484, 633 N.E.2d at 1078, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
474.
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sentence investigation report as a "good 'vantage point'" since
the defendant did not testify on her own behalf, the court
summarily refused to acknowledge any possible domination or
coercion by the defendant's uncle and rather stressed that the
defendant's motive for committing the offense was "a desire 'to
obtain personal profit'" and that the defendant "'received
adequate supervision and that the quality of the home was decent'
during most of her formative years when she was raised by a
grandmother in Jamaica, British West Indies."45
In consideration of the defendant's youth, the court rejected the
notion that adolescent offenders are constitutionally protected
from mandatory imprisonment provisions. 4 6 The court noted that
"the Legislature has consciously extended the A-I felony
mandatory minimums to youths in [the] defendant's age
category." 47 The court reasoned that because of the prevalent
roles that adolescents play in marketing and trafficking illegal
drugs today, the legislature may rationally conclude that they
"pose a serious threat to society." 48 The court found that the
defendant had failed to meet the burden of demonstrating "any
objective basis" to support the assertion that "contemporary
standards of decency prevent imposing a sentence of fifteen years
to life imprisonment upon an older adolescent for a direct
volitional sale of more than two ounces of cocaine for $2,000."49
Therefore, after reviewing the gravity of the defendant's crime,
the general harm it causes to society, comparisons with other
crimes in New York and with the same or similar crimes in other
jurisdictions, the defendant's culpability and the harm that the
defendant's specific conduct causes society, and finding "no
strongly mitigating factors" except the defendant's youth, the
court held that there was no gross disproportionate punishment. 50
The court thus concluded that the New York State Constitution,
article I, section 5 and Eighth Amendment of the United States
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 483-84, 633 N.E.2d at 1078, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
Id. at 484, 633 N.E.2d at 1078, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
Id. at 484, 633 N.E.2d at 1079, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
Id. at 485, 633 N.E.2d at 1079, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 475.

49. Id.
50. Id.
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Constitution proscribing cruel and unusual punishment were not
violated.51
The dissenters, Judges Bellacosa and Ciparick, on the other
hand, argued that imposing the mandatory sentence is a grossly
disproportionate punishment for the defendant's crime because
the case at bar fell within the "rare" case exception in Broadie.52
The dissenters stressed that "Broadie's 'rare case' exception,
examined, understood and applied in the brighter light of
contemporary standards, based on twenty years of experience and
empirical data," applied in this case. 53 Focusing on the numerous
mitigating factors including defendant's total lack of prior
criminal record and no other criminal activity noted in the presentence report or the testimony of the undercover officer, 54 the
domination of her uncle, 55 the deprivation of her natural parents,
and her youth, the dissenters firmly placed the case at bar within
the Broadie's rare case exception. 5 6 The dissenters reasoned that
in assessing the mitigating factors, the trial court and the
appellate court "had the best vantage point to draw inferences,
characterizations and interpretations from the record" rather than
pre-sentence reports by a probation officer, because the courts are
ordinarily and traditionally given deference in sentencing
matters. 57
The dissenters noted that since Broadie, this is the first case
where the court, rather than not disturbing the sentences below,
"substitute[d] the more severe, legislatively mandated minimum
sentence in lieu of the sentence imposed by the prior courts in
their effort to arrive at a constitutional, proportioned and
51. Id.
52. Id. at 488-89, 633 N.E.2d at 1081, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 488, 633 N.E.2d at 1081, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
54. Id. at 491-92, 633 N.E.2d at 1082-83, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 488-500, 633 N.E.2d at 1081-88, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 477-84
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 491, 633 N.E.2d at 1082-83, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/12

10

et al.: Cruel & Unusual Punishment

19951

CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNIS-MENT

appropriate sentence." 58 The dissenters concluded that "by
overturning the opposite views of both prior courts, effectively
renders a first instance judgment that an Eighth Amendment
transgression and the rare case exception are not present." 5 9 That
is, the dissenters reasoned that the court's judgment "allows,
ironically, no judicial sentencing discretion or departure from
absolute mandates [by the Legislature] in the particular
although no branch of the
.
"ase
6...,,0
framework of this
government have been "invested with unilateral power over the
liberty of individuals," 61 but rather "the unique responsibility of
sentencing is traditionally reposed in neutral Magistrates, not in
partisan prosecutors." 62 In .conclusion, the dissenters urged that
the original sentence "should be upheld by affirming the prior
courts as heralds of the arrival of Broadie's promise that a rare
case exception does indeed exist." 63
When faced with the correct set of facts, the courts in New
York have found the "rare case exception" stated in Broadie. The
Appellate Division, First Department in People v. Robinson64
firmly stated that "the instant matter is embraceable within the
guidelines of Broadie."65 The Robinson court held that "the
instant case does represent that rare case which on its particular
facts impels the reasoned conclusion that the statutes have been
unconstitutionally applied insofar as the sentencing of this
defendant is concerned. "66 The defendant in Robinson was
convicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second
degree and sentenced to an indeterminate term from six years to
life imprisonment as mandated by statute. The court found that
58. Id. at 495, 633 N.E.2d at 1085, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 481 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
59. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

60. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 499, 633 N.E.2d at 1087, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. (Bellacosa, I., dissenting).
63. Id. at 500, 633 N.E.2d at 1088, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 484 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
64. 68 A.D.2d 413, 417 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Ist Dep't 1979).
65. Id. at 415, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
66. Id.
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the defendant, who had no prior criminal record, was a mother of
two small children, and who was below average intelligence, was
merely a messenger to deliver the package containing a controlled
substance at the bequest of her husband. 67 In light of the rare
exception rule, the Robinson court modified the sentence,
reducing the imprisonment term to a term of one year to life. 6 8
The United States Supreme Court was faced with the
constitutionality of mandatory sentencing provisions in the
seminal cases of Solem v. Helm69 and Harmelin v. Michigan.7 0
Although both cases involved mandatory sentencing laws that
imposed life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the
Solem Court struck down the mandatory sentencing law while
Harmelin, the most recent case, upheld such mandatory
sentencing provision. 7 1 In Solem, the Court established the
proportionality analysis in assessing whether a sentence was
grossly disproportionate that included the following objective
criteria: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the

penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
67. Id. at 414, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
68. Id. at 415, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 90. Cf. People v. Miranda, 155 A.D.2d
901, 547 N.Y.S.2d 491 (4th Dep't 1989) (dismissing the contention that the
facts of the case constituted the "rare case" exception under Broadie where the
defendant was a willing seller of 10 ounces of cocaine who had previously sold
the same amount and negotiated with an undercover officer by lowering the
price to close the drug transaction); People v. Miller, 126 A.D.2d 868, 511
N.Y.S.2d 160 (3d Dep't 1987) (rejecting the "rare case" exception argument).
69. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the defendant was convicted of
uttering a "no account" check for $100 and under South Dakota recidivist law,
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because the
defendant had six prior felony convictions although the maximum sentence
would have been only 5 years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine if the defendant
had no prior criminal record. Id. at 281-84. The Supreme Court held that such
mandatory sentencing scheme was significantly disproportionate to the crime
committed and thus, violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 303.
70. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). In Harmelin, the defendant was convicted under
Michigan law for the illegal possession of 672 grams of cocaine and was
sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 958.
71. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 485-86, 633 N.E.2d at 1079, 611 N.Y.S.2d
at 475-76.
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the same crime in other jurisdictions." 72 Comparisons may be
"made in the light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim
or society, and the culpability of the offender." 73 These factors
were essentially identical to those set forth by Chief Judge Breitel
in Broadie. In Harmelin, although these same factors were
applied by the dissenters in their proportionality analysis, the
majority of the Supreme Court rejected the notion of a
constitutional proportionality principle. 74 The majority reasoned
that if proportionality principle exists, its real function is to
"enable judges to evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men
and women has considered proportionate - and to say that it is
not." 75 In the real world, however, the Court noted that "the
[Solem] standards seem so inadequate that the proportionality
principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective
values." 7 6 Thus, the Harmelin Court concluded that "Solem was
simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
guarantee" 7 7 and upheld a mandatory sentencing provision
imposing a mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility
8
of parole. 7
In contrast, New York law only requires that the minimum
79
term of sentence be served before the possibility of parole.
Furthermore, similar to the dissenters in Harmelin, the New
York Court of Appeals, in the case at bar, essentially applied the
same factors of proportionality analysis laid-out by Chief Judge
Breitel in Broadie and applied in Solem. Thus, New York law
provides greater protection for its citizens from cruel and unusual
punishment under the State Constitution than federal law provides
under the Eighth Amendment.

72. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
73. Id.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
473.

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 963.
Id. at 977.

Id.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 982.
Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d at 482, 633 N.E.2d at 1077, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
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